Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada Concerning Pacific Salmon, 1985
Pacific Salmon Treaty Act of 1985 (16 U.S.C. 3631)
Canada and the United States
Pacific Salmon Commission
1155 Robson Street, Suite 600
Vancouver, British Columbia
Canada V6E 1B5
Web site: http://www.psc.org/
Executive Secretary: Mr. Ian Todd
Telephone: (604) 684-8081
Fax: (604) 666-8707
The approved Commission budget for Fiscal Year 1997-1998
(April 1, 1997-March 1, 1998) is Canadian $2,229,062 ($800,000 from each Party).
Appointment Process:
The appointment process for U.S. members of the PSC includes several unique features. The legislation implementing the treaty specifies: "The United States shall be represented on the Commission by four Commissioners who are knowledgeable or experienced concerning Pacific salmon, to be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the President. Of these, one shall be an official of the U.S. Government who shall be a non-voting member of the U.S. Section; one shall be a resident of the State of Alaska and shall be appointed from a list of at least six qualified individuals nominated by the Governor of that State; one shall be a resident of the States of Oregon or Washington and shall be appointed from a list of at least six qualified individuals nominated by the Governors of those States; and one shall be appointed from a list of at least six qualified individuals nominated by the treaty Indian Tribes of the States of Idaho, Oregon, or Washington. Two of the initial appointments shall be for 2-year terms; all other appointments shall be for 4-year terms." Legislation also provides for the designation of an Alternate Commissioner for each Commissioner. In the absence of a Commissioner, the Alternate Commissioner may exercise all functions of the Commissioner.
Commissioners:
Mr. James Pipkin (Co-Chair)
Special Federal Negotiator for Pacific Salmon
U.S. Department of the Interior
1849 C Street N.W., Room 4411
Washington, D.C. 20240
Mr. David Benton
Acting Deputy Commissioner
Alaska Department of Fish and Game
P.O. Box 25526
Juneau, AK 99802-5526
Mr. Curt Smitch
Special Assistant, Office of the Governor
P.O. Box 43113
Olympia, WA 98504-3113
Mr. W. Ron Allen
Tribal Chairman
Jamestown S'Klallam Tribe
1033 Old Blyn Highway
Sequim, WA 98382
ALTERNATE COMMISSIONERS
Mr. Larry Rutter
National Marine Fisheries Service
Olympia Field Office
510 Desmond Dr., S.E., Suite 103
Lacey, WA 98503
Mr. Jev Shelton
United Southeast Alaska
Gillnetters Association
1670 Evergreen Avenue
Juneau, AK 99801
Mr. Rollie Rousseau
16420 N.W. Joscelyn
Beaverton, OR 97006
Mr. Ted Strong
Executive Director
Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission
729 N.E. Oregon St., Suite 200
Portland, OR 97232
Advisory Structure:
No formal advisory group currently exists.
Mission/Purpose:
The PSC's mission is to serve as a forum for cooperation between the United States and Canada in the establishment of general fishery management regimes for the international conservation and harvest sharing of intermingling North Pacific salmon stocks. Implementation of the principles of the Pacific Salmon Treaty should enable the two countries, through better conservation and enhancement, to "prevent overfishing and provide for optimum production; and provide for each Party to receive benefits equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its waters." The Commission also serves as a forum for consultation between the Parties on their salmonid enhancement operations and research programs.
Organizational Structure:
The Commission has a complex organizational structure which includes three regional Panels (Northern, Fraser River, and Southern) consisting of 16 U.S. Panel Members (nine of whom are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce). The Northern Panel's stocks of concern are those originating in rivers between Cape Suckling in Alaska and Cape Caution in British Columbia. As its name implies, the Fraser River Panel has regulatory responsibility for stocks of sockeye and pink salmon originating in the Fraser River. The Southern Panel is concerned with stocks originating in rivers south of Cape Caution (not including the Fraser River).
The Panels are responsible for providing advice to the Commission on the management regimes for the intercepting salmon fisheries in those regions, i.e., those in which one or both countries intercept salmon spawned in the other country. This is done by reviewing technical data on annual fishing plans, regulations, and the salmon enhancement programs of each country. Based on the advice provided by the Panels, the PSC formulates management recommendations, including catch limits and related regulations, to present to the two governments. These recommendations become effective upon approval by both governments.
Programs:
The United States and Canada have not been able to agree fully on long-term, coast-wide salmon fishing management regimes since 1992. Over the past five years, the two countries have engaged in a series of high-level, government-to-government attempts to resolve their differences, including negotiations in 1994, a formal mediation effort in 1995-1996, and Pacific salmon stakeholder talks in 1997. Unfortunately, all of these efforts have failed because of differing philosophical and technical approaches to equity and salmon conservation issues.
Canada has long maintained that there is an equity imbalance in favor of the United States (i.e., the U.S. catch of Canadian-origin salmon exceeds Canada's catch of U.S.-origin salmon) and has refused to discuss critical conservation issues and long-term salmon fishery management regimes until the equity issue has been resolved to its satisfaction.
All PSC management regime-based harvest quotas have expired including those for the following intercepting fisheries by area and/or species:
Current Status:
The latest round of negotiations, which began in February 1997 as talks between U.S. and Canada salmon fishery stakeholders (both fishers and industry representatives), has been part of a continuing effort to find a long-term solution to the Pacific Salmon Treaty dispute. The U.S. Northern and Southern Stakeholders put forth packages of innovative proposals that would have involved major financial and social costs to U.S. interests. In the south, these proposals included a regime to rebuild depleted coho salmon stocks of both countries and a reduction in the U.S. catch of Fraser River sockeye salmon through a significant restructuring of the U.S. non-Indian sockeye fishing fleet. Unfortunately, Canada was unwilling to make or accept a proposal that would, at a minimum, assure conservation of both countries' wild coho stocks and allow both countries to maintain viable coho fisheries. In the north, the United States proposed new abundance-based fishing regimes for key boundary area fisheries. Unfortunately, Canada walked away from the negotiation process when agreement appeared possible. On June 26, 1997, Canada officially broke off Pacific salmon negotiations with the United States and called for binding arbitration to resolve salmon conservation and sharing (equity) issues. The United States rejected this approach.
The United States and Canada each appointed a prominent citizen on July 25, 1997, to find the most effective way to reinvigorate the stakeholders process. The two representatives, William Ruckelshaus (United States) and David Strangway (Canada), were charged to act as a resource to the stakeholders and report periodically to the U.S. Secretary of State and Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, respectively. They were asked to function as facilitators, not negotiators.
Messrs. Ruckelshaus and Strangway met many times, individually and together, with both U.S. and Canadian government officials and fishing interest groups in order to become intimately acquainted with everyone's point of view concerning the Pacific salmon dispute. Unfortunately, their efforts were adversely affected by information leaks by Canadian officials to the Canadian Press. These leaks may have been a calculated effort by some elements to create uncertainty and erode stakeholder confidence on both sides. The worst example of this occurred on October 29, 1997, when the Toronto Globe and Mail printed an article based on a leaked "confidential assessment" by Canada's chief negotiator, Yves Fortier. Fortier's assessment was quite disparaging, stating, among other things, that U.S. fishing representatives are too self-interested and incapable of making the sweeping cuts to their own salmon quotas that are necessary to solve the problem. There was also considerable regional opposition to the stakeholder process on both the Canadian and U.S. sides. British Columbia Premier Glen Clark was an outspoken critic of the process, stating that it was doomed to failure unless settlement of the salmon dispute became a political priority in the United States.
Ultimately, Canadian and U.S. fishing interests rejected the stakeholders process. On January 12, 1998, Ruckelshaus and Strangway, submitted to President Clinton and Canadian Prime Minister Chretien a final report on their efforts to try to reinvigorate the Pacific salmon stakeholders process. Unfortunately, the report concluded that the stakeholders process would not be able to achieve the necessary fishing arrangements and, therefore, should not be reconvened. It recommended, however, that the two governments adopt interim fishing arrangements for all relevant species of salmon for up to two years, and that during that two-year period, they develop a practical framework for implementing Article III of the Pacific Salmon Treaty leading to longer term fishing arrangements. (Article III states, among other things, that each Party shall conduct its fisheries and its salmon enhancement programs so as to prevent overfishing and to provide for each Party to receive benefits equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its waters.) At the same time, Ruckelshaus and Strangway also recommend that the two sides undertake a comprehensive review of the Pacific Salmon Commission and dedicate themselves to making it a functional institution for the preservation and management of Pacific salmon.
Both the U.S. and Canadian Governments have indicated that they are ready to work toward implementation of the report's recommendations and are in the process of exploring options for the next steps in the salmon negotiation process.
In June 1996, an internal U.S. State and Tribal agreement was reached to manage the U.S. harvest of far north migrating chinook salmon. The agreement ended a major conflict that had divided the U.S. Section of the PSC for many years. It established an abundance-based, scientifically founded conservation and management regime for chinook harvests not only in 1996, but for the longer term. The United States intended for the U.S. chinook agreement to be the foundation for negotiations leading to a bilateral chinook agreement to replace expired chinook management provisions of Annex IV of the Treaty. However, Canada was unhappy over the U.S. chinook management plan, claiming that it constituted overfishing. On July 15, 1996, Canada officially requested a Technical Dispute Settlement Board (TDSB) to be established under the Treaty to review the U.S. chinook quota and the U.S. adoption of an abundance-based approach. The United States did not agree to Canada's request because it believed that the specific issues Canada raised were of a political nature and therefore are not appropriate for a TDSB to consider. The United States instead requested that the issues be discussed within the Pacific Salmon Commission first. Thus far, Canada has refused to discuss the issue in the Commission forum. The two sides are currently considering other alternatives.
National Marine Fisheries Service,
Headquarters: Paul E. Niemeier
Office of Sustainable Fisheries
1315 East-West Highway
Silver Spring, MD 20910
Telephone: 301-713-2276
Fax: 301-713-2313
E-mail: paul.niemeier@noaa.gov
NOAA: Northwest Region:
Charles K. Walters
Pacific Salmon Treaty Coordinator
7600 Sand Point Way
Seattle, WA 98115-0070
Telephone: 206-526-6155
Fax: 206-526-6534
Department of State:
Bernie Link
Office of Marine Conservation
Washington, D.C. 20520-7818
Telephone: 202-647-2335
Fax: 202-736-7350
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